This paper addresses two major issues from the recent productivity literature. The first question concerns the contributions of information technology (IT) and of multifactor productivity (MFP) to the extraordinary performance of the U.S. economy in the last half of the 1990s. Unemployment fell to historically low levels, without generating the inflationary consequences many economists predicted. Labor productivity (output per hour) emerged from its twenty-year period of stagnation, doubling after 1995 its anemic 1.3% average annual growth between 1973 and 1995 (Chart 1). These developments have been characterized as the emergence of a "new economy," which economists and others have often associated in some manner with the increased use of IT.
treated as separate inputs to production. Thus, designating intermediate inputs-combined energy, materials, and purchased services-as M:
A number of researchers have calculated the contributions of IT and MFP to the post-1995 acceleration of labor productivity growth at the aggregate, economy-wide level (at the aggregate level, of course, the intermediate inputs net out, except for imports, which are normally ignored). The most prominent examples are Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000, hereafter, JS) , Oliner and Sichel (2000, hereafter, OS) , Gordon (2000) and the Council of Economic Advisors (2000) . Results of these studies are summarized in table 1.
Although methodologies and definitions of output differ to an extent among the four studies, they show broadly similar findings.
2 A major portion of the acceleration in LP came from increased growth in capital services per worker (capital deepening). Those studies that separated the contribution of IT capital from that of non-IT capital (OS and JS) found that IT capital (K IT ) is responsible for all of the acceleration in the capital contribution to LP. Although non-IT capital (K N ) contributed to growth after 1995, its contribution to LP growth did not accelerate, it was similar before and after 1995.
All studies agree that accelerating MFP in the IT-producing industries also accounts for a substantial amount of the total acceleration. Perhaps more controversy should have surrounded this finding than has actually emerged. What the authors term the "IT-producing" industries are 2 Jorgenson and Stiroh use a broad measure of output that includes housing and services of consumer durables. Oliner and Sichel use the output concept that corresponds to GDP and the published BLS productivity measures. The Council of Economic Advisers (2000) uses an income-side measure of output growth that shows even greater acceleration than the conventional measures of nonfarm business output (from the national accounts) that are used in the other studies. Gordon (2000) bases his estimates on quarterly measures and he obtains a lower estimate of the acceleration in labor productivity and MFP because he attempts to adjust separately for cyclical influences, a factor which is not explicitly dealt with by the other studies. Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh (2002) have updated the findings in Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) . We have not incorporated their updated results into table 1.
actually the 2-digit machinery producing industries in the old U.S. SIC system. Semiconductors are located in the SIC electrical machinery industry, but so are Christmas tree lights. Computers in this old classification system are grouped with drill bits. It is probably true that the electronics portions of the machinery industries account for a major portion of their MFP growth, but the available data do not actually permit us to say that.
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In contrast, estimates of trend MFP in IT-using sectors (properly, in these studies all sectors other than the two machinery producing industries) vary substantially. As table 1 shows, those "IT-using" sectors accounted for 0.2 (the estimate of Gordon) to 0.7% per year (CEA),
with JS and OS in the middle, roughly in agreement at about 0.5%. The controversy about the contribution of IT and of MFP in IT-using industries provides part of the motivation for the research reported in the present paper.
Several industry-level studies have focused on the post-1995 productivity acceleration in the U.S. Stiroh (2001) examined 61 industries, using data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). An industry is a group of establishments that have similar production functions; approximately, each industry has a different production function from some other industry. Accordingly, one can ask: Is there evidence that a large number of production functions shifted after 1995?
Stiroh reported that two-thirds of the 61 industries showed a positive shift in labor productivity after 1995. Moreover, he found that the industries that had positive productivity shifts were more intensive users of IT capital than those industries that did not have upward productivity shifts-that is, the capital deepening effects of past IT investments on labor productivity showed up strongly in the industry data. Thus, looking across the range of 3 The new NAICS industry classification system separates electronics producing industries and groups them together, which is exactly what economic analysis requires.
industries, something changed in the U.S. economy that affected a large number of different production processes, and IT investment had a substantial role in that labor productivity change.
The McKinsey Global Institute (2001, hereafter, MGI) study asked a different question:
Which industries accounted for the net, economy-wide, U.S. acceleration in labor productivity after 1995? Although a large number of industries showed productivity improvement (the MGI study agreed with Stiroh's findings in this respect), many of those industries have small shares of GDP, so their contribution to the aggregate post-1995 U.S. productivity acceleration is also small. MGI found that six large industries accounted for nearly all of the net, economy-wide labor productivity acceleration, and indeed a large portion of the gross acceleration.
4
If one is interested in the causes of the aggregate productivity acceleration, looking at contributions is the appropriate metric (as it is in the McKinsey study). On the other hand, if one is asking whether IT makes a widespread impact, then the number of industries is the appropriate metric (as it is in the Stiroh study). These two studies are complementary, not conflicting.
MGI (2001) emphasized the importance of managerial innovations, where IT might be a facilitating tool, as well as competitive pressures that forced widespread imitation of managerial innovations that occurred. The MGI study usefully reminds us that no new capital good is simply inserted into the production environment without a great amount of managerial initiative.
This is as true of IT investment as it was of the steam engine two centuries ago. Just because the U.S. now has a large stock of IT does not assure that productivity will continue in the future to grow at its post-1995 rate, contrary to views of some new economy partisans.
Nordhaus (forthcoming) estimated labor productivity for 67 industries, using the BEA industry database, as did Stiroh. Nordhaus computes value added labor productivity, where the other studies (and ours) compute labor and multifactor productivity per unit of output (in national accounts jargon, "gross output").
None of the existing studies reports separate information on services industries. We concentrate on services for two reasons. First, we have been leading a Brookings Institution project on the measurement of output and productivity in the services industries, and services industry productivity remains a challenging issue with many unresolved puzzles. An earlier report on this was Triplett and Bosworth (2001) .
Second, as we noted in our earlier paper, a very large proportion of U.S. IT investment goes into services industries, and indeed, into the services industries whose output poses the most difficult measurement problems. This association between IT and difficult to measure industries was first pointed out by Griliches (1994) . As noted earlier, much of the controversy over the sources and interpretation of the post-1995 spurt in productivity growth in the U.S. concerns ITusing industries. Examining services industries provides information on the role of IT-using industries in the U.S. economy.
We explore the impact of IT and of MFP on services industries by estimating equation
(1) separately for each of twenty-seven 2-digit services industries. Although our study uses the same level of 2-digit detail employed in the Stiroh and Nordhaus studies (and begins as well from the BEA database they used), our research approach is most nearly similar to that of Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2002) who estimated labor productivity, MFP and IT contributions for 39 sectors. Their services sectors are much more aggregated than ours, and their data differ in a number of respects.
II. The Services Industries Productivity Database
As in our earlier paper, we rely primarily on data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) industry output and input program (often referred to as "GDP by industry" accounts cannot be a payment for a service, nor interest received an income for a producing unit). We combined depository (banks) and nondepository financial institutions because after examining the data it appeared to us that a shift of savings and loan institutions to the depository institutions industry in the 1987 SIC revision was not handled consistently in all the data items; aggregating these two financial industries increases consistency.
The BEA industry data have been improved substantially recently, and the improvements make them more suitable for industry productivity analysis. New at the industry level are measures of industry output and purchased intermediate inputs. Formerly, this BEA database contained only value added, which is conceptually less appropriate for estimating productivity.
The improvements are documented in Yuskavage (1996) , and in Lum, Moyer, and Yuskavage (2000) . Certain problems that are apparent only in the improved data are discussed in Yuskavage (2001) ; we consider these below.
For labor input, we take the BEA series on persons engaged in production, because it is consistent with the other BEA data. BEA makes an adjustment for part-time workers and adds an estimate for self-employed labor. 5 The BEA database contains an estimate of compensation for employees, and an estimate of proprietors' income, but no estimate for the labor earnings of the self-employed.
For capital, the BEA database contains property income. However, we estimate the capital share by industry from the BLS estimate of capital income, which is adjusted to yield consistent estimates of the capital income of the self-employed, as described in the appendix.
Labor compensation is then estimated as a residual in order to get a consistent allocation of capital and labor income for the self-employed. 6 The share of intermediate inputs is based on BEA data.
In our earlier paper, we used BEA data on capital stock at the industry level as a measure of capital input. It is of course well established that the BEA "wealth" capital stock that is appropriate for national accounts purposes is not the appropriate capital input measure for productivity analysis. Productivity analysis depends on the concept of the "productive" capital stock, from which one can derive a measure of the capital services the stock renders to production. 7 At the time we did our earlier paper, the theoretically appropriate capital services measures were not available for the services industries we wished to explore. 
III. Services Industries: Labor Productivity Growth
We begin by addressing labor productivity, which in our measure is output per person engaged in production. The services industries for which we calculate productivity are given in The unweighted average of the 27 industries exhibits an average labor productivity growth rate, post-1995, of 2.5% per year, nearly identical to the economy-wide average of 2.6%.
In the lower panels of table 4, we weight these 27 industries using output, value added, and employment weights. 10 Whatever the weights, the average labor productivity growth rate for the 27 services industries is a bit higher than the unweighted average, and accordingly equal to or a bit higher than the economy-wide average. Labor productivity growth in services is considerably greater after 1995 than before, which means that the services industries are consistent with the economy-wide story (chart 1).
We have reservations about the measure of output in the brokerage industry, which shows a huge labor productivity increase, post-1995 ( Because the greatest growth has been in low-fee trades, this gives a lower rate of output growth than the unweighted trades that make up the national accounts measure of output for this industry.
Accordingly, we excluded brokerage and its 20 percent per year labor productivity growth and recalculated table 4-see table 4A. The result, predictably, lowers all the average rates of services industry labor productivity, to an unweighted average of 1.9 percent per year, and an output weighted average of 2.4 percent per year. Even without brokerage, services industries have weighted average labor productivity growth that is about at the national rate, post-1995.
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The right-most columns of tables 4 and 4A show that services industries labor productivity, on average, accelerated after 1995, in step with the economy-wide acceleration in labor productivity ( the industries for which a comparison can be made). We do not explore here whether 1995 is the appropriate break point for analyzing the recent productivity acceleration in services industries.
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Although our results have been anticipated by Sharpe (2000) , strong services industry labor productivity growth is nevertheless news, because service sector productivity has long been regarded as the laggard in industry productivity measures. Our earlier paper (Triplett and Bosworth, 2001 ) was consistent with the slow growth in services productivity idea: We calculated implied non-manufacturing productivity numbers and showed that the post-1973 productivity slowdown was greater in the non-goods producing parts of the economy than in 12 For the full set of 27 industries, the labor productivity acceleration can only be computed relative to 1987-95. At 0.9 percentage points, unweighted (i.e., 2.5 -1.6), it is a little below the economy-wide acceleration of 1.3 percentage points, but the periods over which acceleration is calculated are different. In all cases, excluding brokerage lowers the average acceleration. Note that post-1995 labor productivity growth is not appreciably different for the full set of 27 industries and the smaller set of 22 (table 4) . 13 Stiroh (2001) performed statistical tests on data for 61 industries, and concluded that 1995 was the appropriate break point for annual data. Parham (2002) , on the other hand, contends that productivity acceleration should be measured with respect to productivity peaks. Productivity peaks analysis gives lower acceleration in the US than does use of 1995 as a break point, and 1973-95 or 1987-95 as a comparison interval.
manufacturing. Slow growth in the earlier period is also indicated by the entries in tables 4 and 4A that show, for example, labor productivity growth rates of one percent or less for the interval extending from 1995 back to 1977.
In the most recent period, services industries, on average, have done about as well as the rest of the economy, both in their average rate of labor productivity improvement and in their post-1995 acceleration. This finding is likely to change a great amount of thinking about productivity and about productivity measurement. The remainder of this paper provides an initial exploration of the new developments in services industry labor productivity.
IV. Labor Productivity Acceleration: The Detailed Industry Results
Averages always conceal. Not all services industries performed at the sector-wide average. On the other hand, the sector averages are not caused by the performance of one or two large industries, the improvement in labor productivity is broadly based. occurred in security and commodity brokers, in insurance agents (from a negative labor productivity number in the earlier period to 3 ½ % in the latter), in pipelines and in legal services. One industry (local and inter-urban transit) had negative productivity throughout, but its performance improved greatly after 1995 (that is, its productivity growth became less negative), so we put it in the accelerating group. Indeed, local transit has the sixth largest acceleration (2.7 points) in services industries.
In contrast, seven industries experienced decelerations of labor productivity after 1995.
Of these, the largest declines were rail transportation (-4.9 percentage points), trucking (-2.1 points), and a group at the bottom of table 3, consisting of insurance carriers, education, amusement and recreation, and motion pictures, whose labor productivity deteriorated by -1.4 to -1.7 percentage points. These results are similar to those of Stiroh (2001) . He reports that in 38 out of 61 industries labor productivity accelerated post-1995, so it did not accelerate in 23 industries.
Stiroh does not separately report goods producing and services producing industries.
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V. Contributions to Labor Productivity Growth in the Services Industries
We next analyze accelerations and decelerations of labor productivity using the growthaccounting model. That is: Each industry's change in labor productivity is explained by capital deepening, both from IT capital and from non-IT capital, by increased use of purchased materials and purchased services (intermediate input deepening), and by MFP-see equation (1). We perform the contributions to growth exercise for each of the 27 industries.
The full results are displayed in the Appendix. An extract for the ten highest-performing services industries appears in table 5, where they are arrayed by the size of their labor productivity growth, post-1995. The ten industries in table 5 are the services industries that have labor productivity growth that exceeds (more than marginally) the economy-wide labor productivity growth since 1995.
As one might expect, each of those 10 top performers experienced productivity acceleration, compared with either of the previous two periods (1987-1995 or 1977-1995) . The sole exception is the financial institutions industry, which has slightly lower productivity growth after 1995.
In these 10 industries, labor productivity growth arises from many sources. ICOT capital deepening was a big contributor to labor productivity growth in wholesale trade, transportation services, and banks, and to a lesser extent, in pipelines and business services.
Non-IT capital services were as important as ICOT services in raising labor productivity in pipelines. In other industries, however, non-IT capital was usually less important a contributor to acceleration than was IT capital.
MFP accounted for half or more than half of labor productivity growth in the following industries: brokerage, wholesale trade, retail trade, and pipelines. But MFP was inconsequential in transportation services (which includes travel agents) and business services, even though labor productivity growth was high in those industries. MFP was negative in miscellaneous repair.
The really striking information in Increasing purchased intermediate inputs suggests "contracting out." These activities contributed mightily to labor productivity growth in some of these services industries, though inconsequentially in others. The result suggests that productivity in the services industries has advanced because of the reallocation of economic activity towards more specialized, and hence more productive, producers. Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2002) examine the effects of reallocation among industries on aggregate economic performance.
As we noted earlier, an active research literature on the U.S. labor productivity acceleration (see table 1 ) has focused mostly on the roles of IT capital and of MFP as contributors to high labor productivity growth. In the services industries, is it MFP or IT capital that accounts for labor productivity growth?
The answer from table 5 is: Sometimes one, sometimes the other, sometimes both (brokers, wholesale trade, pipelines), but seldom neither. Sometimes, however, the major factor was neither-the cases where purchased intermediates deepening was a major factor in labor productivity growth include telephone, insurance agents, transportation services, and business services.
Additional insight comes from examining the services industries that had low productivity growth. Table 6 arrays the lowest-performing services industries, ranked on their post-1995 labor productivity change.
What accounts for poor industry labor productivity performance? Again, no single factor emerges. The range of causes in table 6 is perhaps best illustrated by two industries near the middle of the list-local transit and hotels. Local transit has excellent MFP performance (at 2.2%
annually, it is the best of this low-performing group and among the leaders in the group of 27 industries). But this industry has reduced its use of cooperating factors so much that its labor productivity has turned negative. Hotels, on the other hand, have increased their use of cooperating inputs, including ICOT; but that has done them little good, because their MFP has declined greatly. The performance of the hotel industry, including the failure of its investment in IT to raise labor productivity, is analyzed in McKinsey Global Institute (2001).
In contrast to the high productivity growth services industries, contracting out in the form of intermediate input deepening is not prominent in the group of industries included in table 6, radio and TV excepted. Several industries substituted internal production against intermediate inputs, which predictably lowered labor productivity. The ICOT contributions are also mostly low, again with the exception of radio and TV.
One should also note the substantial break between the group of industries at the top of table 6, all of which have labor productivity growing at positive rates, and the group of negative productivity industries at the bottom of the table. Although all of these 10 industries are below the national average labor productivity growth of 2.6% for the post-1995 period, growth rates for some industries at the upper end of table 6 would have looked quite respectable in the recent past. Negative productivity industries in the U.S. and Canada are analyzed in Sharpe, Rao, and Tang (2002) .
Overall: Contributions of ICOT, Intermediate Inputs, and MFP. We noted at the beginning of this section that much recent research on the U.S. productivity acceleration has examined contributions of IT and of MFP. We have emphasized the diversity in performance in services industries, and especially how diverse are these industries with respect to the factors that have raised their productivity growth. We provide some summary measures in tables 7 and 7A. Table 7 shows average contributions to labor productivity acceleration across the 22 industries for which data exist since 1977. To economize on space and calculations, we show contributions to the unweighted average labor productivity acceleration. Note that, as shown in tables 4 and 4A, weighted averages uniformly give higher post-1995 labor productivity accelerations than the unweighted averages we present in table 7. We also calculate contributions excluding the brokerage industry, for the reasons given above.
MFP is the major contributor to acceleration-well over half, whether of not brokerage is excluded. Naturally, both the acceleration itself and the MFP contribution to the acceleration are lower when brokerage is excluded, as already indicated earlier in the paper.
Increased use of IT capital services also plays a major role in boosting labor productivity, and IT provides a larger relative portion of the acceleration when brokerage is excluded. The reason that IT does not play a larger role in the analysis of post-1995 labor productivity acceleration is that its contribution to labor productivity in these services industries was already prominent before 1995. Investment in IT is not new, and it has long been known that much IT investment took place in services (Griliches, 1992; Triplett and Bosworth, 2001 with rapid productivity change, but instead IT capital technology that had been around for a decade or two. Our analysis supports this part of the MGI conclusion: IT capital was a major contributor to LP growth post-1995, but its effects are visible well before.
We also display in table 7 contributions to labor productivity acceleration for those thirteen industries that actually experienced acceleration. For those industries, the average labor productivity acceleration is of course considerably larger than for the whole group of 22. Again, MFP is the main contributor to acceleration, accounting for well over half. All the other factors also play a role, but IT actually follows intermediate deepening in the in the size of its contribution. As before, this is not because IT does not contribute to growth, but because its contribution to growth was already evident in the services industry data before 1995.
In table 7A, we perform the same calculations for the full set of 27 industries, but we are MFP growth is thus a major contributor to services industry labor productivity growth and to post-1995 acceleration. MFP is also the major source of the post-1995 acceleration of LP in services industries.
VI. Caveats and Questions
In the analysis for this paper, we have "pushed" the industry data very far. Even though the production function paradigm applies best to industry data, concern has long been expressed that the consistency of U.S. industry-level data creates formidable problems for carrying out productivity analysis at the detailed level- Baily and Gordon (1988) , and Gordon (2001) . Our data are at the "subsector" level (two digits of the old SIC system), rather than at the "industry" level (four digit SIC). Nevertheless, the concern has validity.
We should first note, however, that the concern applies to any use of the industry data, it does not apply solely to our estimation of contributions to labor productivity. It also applies, for example, to attempts to group industries into "IT intensive" and "non-intensive" industries, a popular approach to analyzing the impact of IT. If the industry data do not prove consistent, then analyzing the industry data grouped in some way or other suffers from the same data deficiencies.
Earlier, we noted that the BLS industry labor productivity program prepares estimates that differ from ours in some aspects of methodology. BLS output measures are different from those of BEA, they compute output per labor hour instead of output per worker (as we do), and other differences occur in certain industries. We use the BEA database mainly because it provides comprehensive coverage of industries. The BLS data are available only for selected industries, so it is impossible to get from them an understanding of economy-wide or sectoral labor productivity trends. Table 9 compares our labor productivity estimates with an alternative published BLS industry labor productivity series that presents output per worker, so it is conceptually closer to our table 3. As table 9 suggests, in many cases the BLS data are published only for selected 3-or 4-digit industries that account for only a fraction of the 2-digit industries to which they belong.
After allowing for the differences in coverage, the correspondence is reasonably close in some cases (trucking, telephone, radio-TV, and personal services), less so in others. Many of these differences in productivity growth rates are no doubt due to coverage differences. However, methodological and date inconsistencies do exist between BEA and BLS databases, and in some cases affect the conclusions. Gordon (2001) emphasizes these inconsistencies. Bosworth (2001) contains a detailed discussion of inconsistencies in the data for transportation industries.
Some of the major inconsistencies of industry data have been discussed quite openly by the statistical agencies themselves. Yuskavage (2001) If labor input and gross output are measured well (and this includes the deflators for output), then labor productivity would be measured accurately, regardless of inaccuracy in the other inputs. This is the reason why many analyses at the industry level have considered only LP. If any of the other inputs were measured inaccurately, this creates mismeasurement in MFP.
To the extent that purchased services are inaccurately measured in Census Bureau collections, for example, the result is mismeasured MFP, so input measurement problems inherently limit the accuracy of our industry MFP measures.
As well, the productivity growth model imposes by assumption the condition that capital earns its marginal product. If that assumption is incorrect, then capital's contribution to production is misstated and MFP is mismeasured. These errors would also bias our estimates of capital's contribution to labor productivity growth.
Moreover, the allocations of capital services across industries may be problematic. As described earlier, we use detailed IT capital services data for our 27 industries, which are available for each year of our study. However, the basic information for allocating IT capital by industry is the BEA capital flow Griliches, 1992, and Fuchs, 1969) . Indeed, McGuckin and Stiroh (2001) contend that increasing mismeasurement of output in the U.S. economy amounts to half a percentage point in economic growth. 15 An assessment of output measurement in some of the services industries that are IT intensive is Triplett and Bosworth (2001) . See also the various papers and workshop agendas on the website for the Brookings Program on Economic Measurement (http://www.brook.edu/es/research/projects/productivity/productivity.htm), as well as the discussions of services measurement issues in the Eurostat handbook on price and output measures in national accounts (Eurostat, 2001) .
Against all this, we feel that the U.S. statistical system has recently made substantial improvements to industry-level data. These improvements have not widely been noticed. No 15 However, they introduce the implicit assumption that improving the measurement of output will raise output growth rates. This has sometimes been the case, empirically. But we are not convinced that services sector output was measured better in the U.S. in the 1950's and 1960's, as their assumption must imply if it is applied to the 1973-95 era.
doubt measurement problems remain, but the situation today is far better than it was when Baily and Gordon (1988) reviewed consistency of the industry data for productivity analysis.
First, the BEA GDP by industry accounts now include a full accounting for inputs and outputs. That full accounting imposes the discipline of a check that was not present when the accounts focused only on value added. Put another way, when only an estimate of value added was available at the industry level, the problems discussed by Yuskavage (2001) were simply unknown to researchers, unless they dug deeply beneath the veneer of the published statistics.
Second, the Census Bureau, in the 1997 economic censuses, collected more penetrating information on purchased services than had been the case in earlier economic statistics for the United States. Information on purchased inputs at the industry level is still a problem for productivity analysis, but the state of the statistics is much improved over earlier years.
Third, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, in its Producer Price Index (PPI) program, has moved aggressively in the 1990s into constructing output prices for services industries. A number of these initiatives have been discussed in the series of Brookings workshops on economic measurement. All the problems of services sector deflation have not been solved, and for some services industries the difficulty of specifying the concept of output limits the validity of deflators. But the remaining problems should not obscure the progress. Tremendous improvement has occurred since the discussion of measurement problems in the services industries in Griliches (1994) .
Does improved measurement account for the acceleration in service industry
productivity? That is, is the productivity surge in services in some sense a statistical illusion?
Perhaps the cure for Baumol's Disease was found years ago, only the statistics didn't record it, or perhaps the services industries were never sick, it was just, as Griliches suggested, that the measuring thermometer was wrong.
A full answer to that question is beyond the scope of this paper. For one accelerating industry, however, the answer is clearly yes: The acceleration in medical care labor productivity (-0.5 before 1995, +0.7 percent after, with MFP "accelerating" from -1.5 to -0.4) is undoubtedly the effect of the new BLS medical care PPI industry price indexes that began in 1992 and replaced the old CPI-based medical care deflators in national accounts (see Berndt, et al, 2001 ).
The PPI indexes rose more slowly than the CPI indexes they replaced (an overlap period confirms that it was methodology, not health care cost containment, that accounts for the difference).
Medical care productivity was understated by a large amount before 1992. Triplett 
VII. Conclusion.
In their labor productivity and MFP performance, services industries have long appeared unhealthy, especially so since the great productivity slowdown after 1973. With some exceptions, they appear lively and rejuvenated today.
We find that post-1995 services industries labor productivity growth has proceeded at about the economy-wide rate. Moreover, services industries have experienced an acceleration of labor productivity after 1995 that is comparable with the aggregate acceleration that has received so much attention. These changes are broadly based, they are not just the effects on the average of a small number of large industries. For example, of the 22 industries for which data exist for the whole period of our study, 13 experienced accelerating LP after 1995.
With respect to the sources of labor productivity improvement in services industries, growth in MFP, IT capital deepening, and increased use of intermediate inputs (especially in the fastest growth services industries) all played a role. With respect to the post-1995 acceleration of labor productivity, however, MFP is the dominant factor in the acceleration, because IT capital deepening was as prominent a source of labor productivity growth before 1995 as after.
Finally, Griliches (1992 Griliches ( , 1994 suggested that measurement difficulties, particularly conceptual problems in defining and measuring output and price deflators, might have made these industries' productivity performance in the past seem less robust than it actually was. In our assessment, much improvement has been made in the U.S. industry database in the last decade, and the improved database makes us more confident in industry productivity estimates, even though much measurement work remains to be done to improve our understanding of productivity trends in services industries. Table 1 Alternative Estimates of the Acceleration of Productivity Growth, Post-1995 Labor productivity is output (excluding indirect business taxes) per person engaged in production.
Chart 1 Nonfarm Labor Productivity
The output share is the sum of industry output (excluding indirect business taxes) from 1995-2000 divided by the sum of all services outputs (excluding IBT) over the same period. Acceleration 1995 , Relative to: 1977 -1995 1987 -1995 1995 1977 -1995 1987 -1995 The 27 industries group includes all industries listed in the appendix table and described in the data appendix. The 22 industries group is the subset of the 27 industries group with gross output data available before 1987.
Table 4 Average Service Industry Labor Productivity
For each paired years t and t+1, the output weight for industry i is the average share for industry i in the two years, where the share in t equals the output (excluding IBT) of industry i in year t over the sum of all services outputs (minus IBT) in year t.
For each paired years t and t+1, the value added weight for industry i is the average share for industry i in the two years, where the share in t equals the value added (excluding IBT) of industry i in year t over total services industries value added (minus IBT) in year t.
For each paired years t and t+1, the employment weight for industry i is the average share for industry i in the two years, where the share in t equals persons engaged in production in industry i in year t over persons engaged in production in all services industries in year t.
The weighted average annual growth rate of labor productivity is
where w it is the weight of industry i in year t, Q it is industry i's output in year t, and L it is the number of persons engaged in production in industry i in year t.
Table 4A
Average Service Industry Labor Productivity, Excluding Brokers Acceleration 1995 , Relative to: 1977 -1995 1987 -1995 1995 1977 -1995 1987 -1995 Excluding security and commodity brokers.
Weights constructed as in Table 4 . All contributions are average annual growth rates of inputs multiplied by value shares. The contributions do not sum to labor productivity because they are growth rates, which are multiplicative and not additive (e.g. 1.202=1.112*1.002*1.001*1.078).
The percentage distribution of the contributions to labor productivity is calculated from the aggregation of log differences over the time period. If i is the input, a is the share, L is the labor input, and Q is output, then the percentage of the contribution of input i to labor productivity growth over time t is: Definitions are the same as in Table 5 .
When labor productivity growth is negative, the signs of the percentage contributions are multiplied by -1, so a positive percentage corresponds to a positive contribution labor productivity, Thus, in these cases, the percents sum to -100. (1995 ( Relative to 1977 ( -1995 Group accelerations are the average of each industry's acceleration in the group, that is: ∑ i accel i /n, i.e. the labor productivity acceleration is the difference in the average annual labor productivity growth rates in the two time periods, or
Table 7 Contributions to Labor Productivity Acceleration
where for the 1995-2000 time period, t=1996, 1997,…2000 and T=5. Likewise, for the 1977-1995 period, t=1978, 1979,….1995 and T=18. 
Table 7A
Contributions to Labor Productivity Acceleration (1995 ( Relative to 1987 ( -1995 Industry Groups and weights constructed as in Table 4 . 
Data Appendix
The data are obtained from two sources; the BEA GDP by industry file and unpublished capital input and capital services data from the BLS. Value added in the GDP by industry file is the sum of the compensation of employees, indirect business taxes, and property-type income. Gross output, which is value added plus intermediate inputs, is not available before 1977, and for some industries, is not available before 1987.
The real value of gross output is obtained from the BEA industry file. As measures of the growth in the real value of the inputs, we use persons engaged in production for labor, the quantity index for intermediate inputs from BEA for intermediate inputs, and the real capital input index from BLS for capital.
The income shares used in the growth accounting calculations are all expressed as shares of output minus indirect business taxes (GDP at factor cost). Capital share and its distribution among different types of capital is obtained from the BLS data set, and intermediate inputs are from BEA. The labor compensation share of output is calculated as a residual for reasons discussed below.
The BEA compensation data does not include the labor earnings of the self-employed, which are all assigned to capital. The BLS uses an elaborate algorithm to adjust their capital and labor income shares for the self-employed. Thus, we used their estimates of capital income and obtained labor compensation by subtracting the capital income from GDP at factor cost. This does introduce one source of inconsistency in the current data set. Because the BLS methodology includes property and motor vehicle taxes as part of capital income, our measure, which excludes all indirect business taxes, understates the amount of labor income. This problem will be corrected in a future revision.
Our broad definition of service industries includes the SIC groups transportation, communications, trade, FIRE, and services. We exclude the following service industries from the analysis: holding and other investment offices, social services, membership organizations, and other services. In those cases we lacked consistent measures of output and all of the inputs.
